tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post6021031690754172204..comments2023-10-14T09:40:06.690-05:00Comments on Jean Kazez: Does Determinism Rule out Responsibility?Jean Kazezhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00592593002719828153noreply@blogger.comBlogger19125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-63515693160634275002010-12-03T10:44:48.589-06:002010-12-03T10:44:48.589-06:00This is a strange one. Jones couldn't have cho...This is a strange one. Jones couldn't have chosen any other course of action than he did choose, but he certainly could have *originated* - to borrow the not necessarily coherent language of non-determinism - a choice not to have voted for Obama (which would have been evidenced by the triggering of the chip); and it's that possibility which hard determinists deny, and which lies behind Jeremy Stangroomhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10140136966531444710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-67455992266242738192010-11-18T23:17:58.768-06:002010-11-18T23:17:58.768-06:00Decisively identify hmmmm? And does one CHOOSE to ...Decisively identify hmmmm? And does one CHOOSE to decisively identify...or is decisive identifcation something that HAPPENS to you?<br /><br />I think in terms of language with the "X to do otherwise" we need to be very careful. The preceeding dicussion shows very clearly (to my mind anyway) that "couldn't have done otherwise" doesn't cut it as a phrasing. Only "Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-18549198875691759832010-11-18T19:30:55.807-06:002010-11-18T19:30:55.807-06:00Frankfurt says that in order for something to be a...Frankfurt says that in order for something to be a second order desire, you have to decisively identify (or something to that effect... I forgot what the exact phrasing is) with it, in order to stop infinite regressions like this. <br /><br />If Mr. Jones was acting in accordance with his second order desire, then he is free. He gives us this definition of freedom, since traditionally it is Waynehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08627147979307495870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-43822293874543186612010-11-17T11:46:59.597-06:002010-11-17T11:46:59.597-06:00I think the second order desire stuff is a bit dif...I think the second order desire stuff is a bit different from the The False Door example, and the Mr. Jones stuff, and very interesting on its own. But I'm not sure about it. I'm not sure (but open to consider the possibilities surrounding) the following:<br /><br />1. Whether or not there is any realtionship between a second order desire and the possibility of fulfilling the desire. <br Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-86683131171226627992010-11-17T08:59:58.866-06:002010-11-17T08:59:58.866-06:00Right.... but Frankfurt is taking issue with B. ...Right.... but Frankfurt is taking issue with B. He thinks we can be responsible for things that we choose, even if we couldn't choose otherwise. <br /><br />So I make a choice. X. It seems to me that I could choose Y when I'm choosing, but in fact I can't. We both seem to agree that I've chosen X. (Hard determinists would argue that I didn't choose)<br /><br />Now let Waynehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08627147979307495870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-53353083961554037082010-11-16T21:32:02.492-06:002010-11-16T21:32:02.492-06:00If you ammend it that way I agree it's a choic...If you ammend it that way I agree it's a choice. In your original description there was no "I could leave right now.." thought presented. <br /><br />So lets take a look here:<br /><br />I'm in a room I can't leave (the door opens to a brick wall, it's a false door, a locked door etc etc). <br /><br />I choose to stay in the room (OR I choose not to leave the room). <br Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-39910510134889726782010-11-16T11:32:09.851-06:002010-11-16T11:32:09.851-06:00How is it not a choice? Lets say while you're...How is it not a choice? Lets say while you're in this room, you see the door, and think, "gosh I could leave right now..." (which is incorrect) "But I don't want to at all! This place is great! I choose to stay here for a very long time!"<br /><br />If you want to stick to your guns, the only reason why this is not a choice, is because the door is locked. If the Waynehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08627147979307495870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-19850466415338430602010-11-15T11:40:15.407-06:002010-11-15T11:40:15.407-06:00I would say that choosing plays no part in the roo...I would say that choosing plays no part in the room bit. Choice has, as it were, not even arisen. It's pre-choice. A bit like distracted driving.Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-88349280056973500322010-11-15T10:55:12.324-06:002010-11-15T10:55:12.324-06:00Maybe a better example might be Locke's prison...Maybe a better example might be Locke's prisoner example. Imagine that you wake up one day in a room that you did not fall asleep in. Its a rather comfortable room. There a lot of interesting things to explore. And inside the room, is a long missed friend happy to explore the room with you. You never once think to yourself, "I would like to leave this room." So you willingly Waynehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08627147979307495870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-38210045932290928982010-11-15T10:47:31.136-06:002010-11-15T10:47:31.136-06:00Even better!
So to reframe:
"If Jones were ...Even better!<br /><br />So to reframe:<br /><br />"If Jones were to show any inclination to refrain from murdering the innocent, then the computer, through the chip in Jones’s brain, would intervene to assure that he actually chooses to murder the innocent."<br /><br />I'm 100% confident that the court, having discovered the chip in Jones brain that was programed to cause him to Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-48384933459709195582010-11-15T07:34:18.369-06:002010-11-15T07:34:18.369-06:00The chip in Jones's brain is on standby to mak...The chip in Jones's brain is on standby to make sure he <i>chooses</i> to vote for Obama (and so does vote for Obama).<br /><br />"If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for McCain (or, let us say, anyone other than Obama), then the computer, through the chip in Jones’s brain, would intervene to assure that he actually decides to vote for Obama and does so vote."Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00592593002719828153noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-23483407771245044232010-11-14T19:10:48.199-06:002010-11-14T19:10:48.199-06:00Here is a variant on this:
Let’s say that Mr. Jone...Here is a variant on this:<br />Let’s say that Mr. Jones is going to vote. He will do this by pushing one of two buttons. <br /><br />One button says "Obama" <br />One buttons says "McCain"<br /><br />Unbeknownst to Mr. Jones, both of these buttons operate the same circuit: they both will vote for Obama. <br /><br />Can Jones choose not to vote for Obama? Yes. He can choose toFaustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-30629908358522857652010-11-14T18:56:00.652-06:002010-11-14T18:56:00.652-06:00Only one of the two murderous Mr. Jones is respons...Only one of the two murderous Mr. Jones is responsible: the one that was not interfered with by Mr. Black. Similarly in the with the Obama voting. <br /><br />There is no mind changing here. There is 1. Choosing and 2. Doing. <br /><br />In both cases Mr. Jones CAN choose otherwise, but he can't DO otherwise. <br /><br />Responsibility pertains to the choosing not to the doing. <br /><br />Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-18477833059993471432010-11-14T18:22:22.106-06:002010-11-14T18:22:22.106-06:00It seems like you changed your mind half way throu...It seems like you changed your mind half way through.<br /><br />You say that Jones CAN choose otherwise, even if Black is on standby to make sure he chooses Obama. [My thought-- That's awfully subtle. In what sense can he choose otherwise?]<br /><br />Then you imagine that Jones chooses to murder someone, and Mr. Black is on standby to make sure he makes that choice. You say he "Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00592593002719828153noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-83448509922584608112010-11-14T17:11:51.011-06:002010-11-14T17:11:51.011-06:00I get it, but it's just nonsense as near as I ...I get it, but it's just nonsense as near as I can tell. <br /><br />Here is the problem:<br /><br />Jones CAN choose otherwise in this example. It's just that WHEN he chooses otherwise then he gets "redirected" by black. That's why we have the "intuition" that he is responsible. Because we know that he COULD have chosen not to vote for Obama (it's just that Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-12880396314597194962010-11-14T15:22:20.371-06:002010-11-14T15:22:20.371-06:00Faust, The thought experiment's purpose is to ...Faust, The thought experiment's purpose is to respond to reasoning that goes "if (A) causal determinism is true, it follows that (B) whatever people choose, they couldn't have chosen otherwise, and from (B) it follows that (C) they're not responsible."<br /><br />The idea is to challenge the inference from (B) to (C) by describing a case where a person couldn't have Jean Kazeznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-50434686796924131802010-11-14T12:10:25.007-06:002010-11-14T12:10:25.007-06:00It seems clear to me that Jones can choose what he...It seems clear to me that Jones can choose what he wants to do, but he can't choose what he does. If he wants to vote O then he can. If he doesn't want to vote for O then he will. <br /><br />So his choice of his desire is not determined.<br /><br />However we can just push the whole thing back. The thought experiment seems like a trick to me: first separate choice and outcome, then say &Faustnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-2922056162066553302010-11-13T20:58:52.017-06:002010-11-13T20:58:52.017-06:00Faust- Right, because it seems like moral respons...Faust- Right, because it seems like moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Jones doesn't have the ability to do otherwise, but fully and completely wills to do what he's determined to do. Nothing prevented him from doing what he wanted to do, but he really had no other choice. <br /><br />So would we say he chose to do what he did? It sure seems like it. So Waynehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08627147979307495870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-62469358089407279472010-11-13T15:31:56.108-06:002010-11-13T15:31:56.108-06:00wow. I really don't get this one.
Let me get...wow. I really don't get this one. <br /><br />Let me get this straight: <br /><br />Jones is free as long as he doesn't violate a particular condition. So he is free to choose Obama, but if he chooses not-Obama, he will be overidden. <br /><br />Therefore "he" is not determined unless he goes outside a particular set of paramaters. <br /><br />Therefore determinism doesn't Faustnoreply@blogger.com