tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post608625489567617471..comments2023-10-14T09:40:06.690-05:00Comments on Jean Kazez: Absent PainsJean Kazezhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00592593002719828153noreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-52056060423133381322011-06-10T13:53:29.597-05:002011-06-10T13:53:29.597-05:00I found another thing that bothers me about his re...I found another thing that bothers me about his reasoning. As the classic example goes it is good to satisfy our thirst, but we don't make ourselves thirsty in order to satisfy one more preference. Benatar has a similar ingenious example about the Sick person who has the good ability to heal quickly, and the Healthy that doesn't have this ability, but never gets sick and so is not worse ɽɞʧʖʁʖɤɛʟɟʗɜʭʠʈʟɱʫɝʬnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-38577484632632547382011-06-08T09:08:04.655-05:002011-06-08T09:08:04.655-05:00There are lots of things that bother me.
(1) I...There are lots of things that bother me. <br /><br />(1) I think the tables make it seem as if we are figuring out what is actually better FOR X, scenario A or scenario B. That's important to Benatar's case that birth personally harms the person born. But then he's got the problem that X doesn't exist in scenario B, so how can anything be bad or good for X there? He solves Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-24493819571862563032011-06-08T08:36:36.823-05:002011-06-08T08:36:36.823-05:00I re-read the passages, but there's always som...I re-read the passages, but there's always something missing. Too much handwaving for my taste. the 2x2 matrix is way too simplistic, there are at least 3 dimensions: pleasure/pain, actual/potential person, presence/absence. <br /><br />for each of the 8 possibilities there's a value to be given (good, bad, not good, not bad), but it's not some linear metric since the good actual ʮɖɵʁɬɭʝʭɩʁɻɘʨɡʚɗʩɯʋɤnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-75212726930916056842011-06-07T07:28:33.827-05:002011-06-07T07:28:33.827-05:00Thanks very much for that passage--that's exac...Thanks very much for that passage--that's exactly what we needed. I think you put it well before--"lack of harm is good in the counterfactual personal sense" (on Benatar's view). I think it's questionable whether it's good even in that sense, but I think that captures the view well.<br /><br />I'll have a look at that link.Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-4710885869548524412011-06-07T00:32:57.205-05:002011-06-07T00:32:57.205-05:00Another blogger is working on the same problem her...Another blogger is working on the same problem here<br /><br />http://shaunmiller.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/benatar-why-coming-into-existence-is-always-a-harm/<br /><br />he has some interesting commentsɷɑɜɵʅʟɷʜɷʭɺɒʪɡʡɕʀʫʚɻnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-47229468499702570462011-06-06T12:20:37.070-05:002011-06-06T12:20:37.070-05:00Here's the relevant quote
(3) the absence of ...Here's the relevant quote<br /><br />(3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed<br />by anyone ...<br /><br />The judgement made in (3) is made with reference to the (potential)<br />interests of a person who either does or does not exist. To this it might be objected that because (3) is part of the scenario under<br />which this person never exists, (3) cannot say ɐɽʤʎʂɒɧʆʜɿɒʖʓʑɹɚɣɫɮʌnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-18087371325334089292011-06-06T08:29:03.999-05:002011-06-06T08:29:03.999-05:00All that sounds plausible, but I don't see how...All that sounds plausible, but I don't see how he could be saying a non-existent pain is good *only* in the counterfactual sense that existing pain is bad for someone.<br /><br />If the good of non-existent pain is completely parasitic on the bad of existing pain (for someone), then there should be no pain/pleasure asymmetry. The good of existing pleasure ought to yield the bad of Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-31133103896077558212011-06-06T04:51:27.528-05:002011-06-06T04:51:27.528-05:00Peter Singer attacks this point directly (and make...Peter Singer attacks this point directly (and makes reference to Benatar's book) in his new edition of "Practical Ethics".<br /><br />Here's the link to the relevant pages<br /><br />http://bit.ly/jWfr4j<br /><br />I think the "moral ledger" concept is very close to Benatar's approach.ɾʡɦɹʆɓɓɕʣʝɦʞʆɸɛɱʒʏʑɯnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-80590484155909558142011-06-06T01:58:10.173-05:002011-06-06T01:58:10.173-05:00I think my quote above "we might then want to...I think my quote above "we might then want to speak loosely about never coming<br />into existence being ‘better’" is quite clear (maybe he refined his thinking from the 1997 article to the 2008 book?).<br /><br />What is bad is bad for a real people, but the good of non-existance is good for no-one. Everything else seems to be "loose" speak. <br /><br />So non-existance is ʝɺɟʕʚɢɕɧʟɟɥəɝʇɹɚʤʎɮʗnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-65768558534291413412011-06-05T21:26:47.326-05:002011-06-05T21:26:47.326-05:00Squiggly, As much as the reasoning you impute to B...Squiggly, As much as the reasoning you impute to Benatar is at least coherent, I don't think it's his reasoning exactly. He's very insistent that he's making an argument using "personal affecting" principles, not an impersonal, consequentialist argument. The problem with creating a child is that doing so harms the child personally, not just that it creates less than the Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-73812155669689696082011-06-05T21:25:20.742-05:002011-06-05T21:25:20.742-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-56959124579292169592011-06-05T14:48:42.295-05:002011-06-05T14:48:42.295-05:00hmm, sorry to disagree but I think that your readi...hmm, sorry to disagree but I think that your reading "The table is comparing the situation for that person, depending on whether he exists or never exists." is not correct. Nothing can be good or bad for those who don't exist. <br /><br />Benatar (if I get this right) sets the bar at zero: in the best possible state of affairs there is no sentient life and no suffering. Any new lifeʤʨʮʇɕɗʊɞʓʉʯʬɴɮʆʭʥɵɫʍnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-71206769572160903972011-06-05T10:01:30.618-05:002011-06-05T10:01:30.618-05:00Eric, Good question--if there are a whole bunch of...Eric, Good question--if there are a whole bunch of absent children (so lots of absent pain), does that make up for the suffering of childless people, who wish they had children? I think an accountant would frown on this sort of assessment. Absent pains are not bad, but it's over-valuing them to say they are good.Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-12068163983894111532011-06-05T09:58:15.899-05:002011-06-05T09:58:15.899-05:00Squiggle, I think it's important to Benatar to...Squiggle, I think it's important to Benatar to be read as saying that birth "harms"--it's bad for an individual, there's a victim. We don't just "do bad" when we have a kid, but do bad to someone. <br /><br />My take on it (I could be wrong) is that it's an important part of his argument for harm that, in that key table, absent pains are taken to be good Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-5194843379140322372011-06-05T02:34:34.250-05:002011-06-05T02:34:34.250-05:00Suppose I refrain from writing a piece of poetry a...Suppose I refrain from writing a piece of poetry and I am very bad poet. Does not having written my ugly poem make for something beautiful? It seems not, to me at least.<br /><br />Also, doesn't Benatar's position seem to imply that, since there is an indefinitely large number of absent children, the good of these absent children's absent pain could make up for, on some utilitarian Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-15320191930633369962011-06-05T02:17:26.494-05:002011-06-05T02:17:26.494-05:00yes, that's Benatar (Introduction, page 4).
i...yes, that's Benatar (Introduction, page 4).<br /><br />it's not difficult to reconcile with the other statements, I think. One is a statement about the individuals (and somebody who doesn't exist cannot be better off), while the other is a comparison between two state of affairs.<br /><br />Following paragraph "Once we acknowledge that coming into existence can be a<br />harm, weɲʨɱʭʈʡɒɮʆʕɔʋʚɶɻɤʤɔɶʓnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-69182945597781235252011-06-04T06:55:45.977-05:002011-06-04T06:55:45.977-05:00Squiggly Name, Thank you, that's helpful.I tak...Squiggly Name, Thank you, that's helpful.I take it the passage is from Benatar? If so, it's difficult to reconcile with his tables. In the table, the lack of pain in the never-existent is labeled GOOD. On that basis, he says never existing is preferable, as far as pain goes. (The argument, then, is that we can't say that lack of pleasure in the never-existent is GOOD. Because of Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-68055105741223742922011-06-04T02:55:50.350-05:002011-06-04T02:55:50.350-05:00did you read degrazia's answer to benatar?
ht...did you read degrazia's answer to benatar?<br /><br />http://philpapers.org/rec/DEGIIWɱʇɢɓɩɼʝɥʠʉɞɭʦɣɲʙɟɘɢʈnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-59310718709287645212011-06-04T02:54:21.273-05:002011-06-04T02:54:21.273-05:00since we are talking about comparisons, A advantag...since we are talking about comparisons, A advantages compared to B are B disadvantages compared to A. I think there's only one set of facts and two way to phrase it. <br /><br />(A-B=2; B-A=-2)<br /><br />Otherwise you have to step out of comparisons. Parfit does this (if remember correctly), and Benatar too:<br /><br />"I shall not claim that the never-existent literally are better off.ʨʎɿɕɾʗɣʟɐʯʢɵʫɪɢʮʇɣʞʃnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-26464246591804229802011-06-03T20:08:08.862-05:002011-06-03T20:08:08.862-05:00OK, but if you're comparing Syria and Texas, a...OK, but if you're comparing Syria and Texas, and you list all the present goods and present bads in both places, that gives you the basis for a preference. It seems like talking about absent pains in Texas is just double counting the present pains in Syria. That's my thought anyway....Jean Kazezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06297159994901018071noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8310450667755637519.post-61607519251564959512011-06-03T19:39:17.631-05:002011-06-03T19:39:17.631-05:00Hmmm... Someone who escaped from Syria and went to...Hmmm... Someone who escaped from Syria and went to Texas would no doubt think it a very good thing that the army isn't shooting peaceful demonstrators in the streets. The absence of shooting implies the presence of a certain political culture. And a world without AIDS will entail the presence of a cure. Similarly, the absence of monsoon weather in Paris implies the presence of an alternative Aeolushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15772583359516799143noreply@blogger.com