Different factions of the abolitionist community are arguing about this question (here and here), which surprises me. You'd think the answer was obvious: of course men can be feminists. In fact, you'd think advocates for animals would reach that conclusion especially quickly, and in unison.
Background: I like to use the word "animalist" as a term for animal advocates who challenge traditional views about the moral status of non-human animals--whether they're utilitarian, rights-oriented, abolitionist, feminist care-oriented, etc. I think of the word "animalist" on the model of "feminist". Like feminists are strong advocates for women, aiming to lift women out of their traditional inferior role, animalists aim to raise the status of non-human animals. The parallel makes it particularly perplexing that anyone would doubt that men can be feminists. Human animals aren't just capable of being animalists--i.e. advocating strongly for non-human animals; they're the only animalists. Non-human animals obviously can't advocate for themselves, in any articulate and effective way. Humans' being members of the "oppressor class" clearly doesn't stop them from adopting an animalist mission and perspective. Sure, there are some limits on our ability to imagine what it is like to be a captive chicken, but that doesn't stop us humans from trying, and from being adamantly pro-chicken.
Likewise, surely, the man who advocates for women. A man can't know exactly what it's like to be a woman, but he's in no worse position (surely) than someone who tries to understand and advocate for chickens. If there are no male feminists, then there are no human animalists. All animalists should therefore immediately agree: since there are (obviously) human animalists, there can also be male feminists. I only wish there were more of them!
4/26/13
4/25/13
Was I once an egg?
Short recap of the Marquis argument I was responding to in my last post: Marquis says killing one of us is wrong because it takes away a FLO (future like ours). But abortion takes a FLO from a fetus. So abortion is wrong too.
Here's a response to Marquis I find intriguing/bewildering. Eugene Mills says if I was once a zygote, I was also once an egg. I wasn't also once a sperm. No, I was just once an egg. So if it's wrong to take the FLO from a zygote, it's also got to be wrong take the FLO from an egg. We have to be deeply concerned about using contraception to block conception. That's (surely) absurd, so there must be something wrong with Marquis's stance on abortion.
Was I really once an egg? An editorial in the New York Times last summer, written by a biologist (so he should know!) says yes, I really was. Greg Hampikian writes (here)
***
Now, here's why I'm bewildered: Mills and Hampikian say I was once an egg, but when I look closely at the "facts of life" it doesn't look to me like this is true. Watch the crucial clip of this video, which was made by what appears to be a reliable medical media company. Sperm penetrates egg. As a result, the sperm generates a haploid pronucleus and so does the egg. Each pronucleus appears to be a separate entity--EP and SP, let's call them. They then fuse, forming the diploid cell, Z. If EP and SP are two distinct entities, and they fuse, the logic of identity precludes saying that Z=EP. No, EP and SP go out of existence; Z is a third and new entity.
Here are the crucial frames. There are two separate entities, EP and SP; they are pulled together by "threads" and fuse.
In this clip, the egg is just the site in which EP and SP fuse, forming the new entity Z. Z is inside of the egg, not identical to the egg. We are invited to think Z is the start of a new human being, not the containing egg. In fact, the narrator calls the newly formed single cell a "zygote", instead of using that term to refer to the whole fertilized egg.
Another video tells the same story. Here's the crucial clip of that video with the key frames below. Again, separate pronuclei exist inside the egg and fuse.
Once again, this diagram of fertilization tells a story that suggests two entities fusing to generate a third--
If I was never a 5-day old zygote, then I was never anything that existed before the 5-day old zygote existed. For example, I was never an egg in my mother's ovary. QED!
Bottom line: I was never an egg. No, condemning the killing of a fetus does not drive us to the absurdity that we mustn't block the fertilization of an egg. You can say a fetus has a FLO but an egg doesn't, because it's not true that we were once eggs. There is no continuous entity that starts off existing before fertilization and continues for the first 14 days and then for the duration of pregnancy, and then through ordinary life, so that it has a FLO. If you want to refute Marquis, you need something else besides the idea that his reasoning turns contraception into murder.
Here's a response to Marquis I find intriguing/bewildering. Eugene Mills says if I was once a zygote, I was also once an egg. I wasn't also once a sperm. No, I was just once an egg. So if it's wrong to take the FLO from a zygote, it's also got to be wrong take the FLO from an egg. We have to be deeply concerned about using contraception to block conception. That's (surely) absurd, so there must be something wrong with Marquis's stance on abortion.
Was I really once an egg? An editorial in the New York Times last summer, written by a biologist (so he should know!) says yes, I really was. Greg Hampikian writes (here)
Your life as an egg actually started in your mother’s developing ovary, before she was born; you were wrapped in your mother’s fetal body as it developed within your grandmother.So (says Hampikian/Mills) I go back a long way--to child-me, to baby-me, to fetal-me, to zygote-me, to egg-me. There is one continuous entity there, though picked out by different terms at different stages (child, baby, fetus, zygote, egg). The sperm is crucial for making me go on from being an egg to being a zygote, but there is no symmetry here. I was once an egg but I was never a sperm. Importantly, the sperm does not induce "substantial change". The sperm does not make one thing go out of existence (the egg) and a second thing come into existence (the zygote). One thing is prodded to continue existing, because of the sperm, instead of a new entity coming into being.
After the two of you left Grandma’s womb, you enjoyed the protection of your mother’s prepubescent ovary. Then, sometime between 12 and 50 years after the two of you left your grandmother, you burst forth and were sucked by her fimbriae into the fallopian tube. You glided along the oviduct, surviving happily on the stored nutrients and genetic messages that Mom packed for you.Then, at some point, your father spent a few minutes close by, but then left. A little while later, you encountered some very odd tiny cells that he had shed. They did not merge with you, or give you any cell membranes or nutrients — just an infinitesimally small packet of DNA, less than one-millionth of your mass.
***
Now, here's why I'm bewildered: Mills and Hampikian say I was once an egg, but when I look closely at the "facts of life" it doesn't look to me like this is true. Watch the crucial clip of this video, which was made by what appears to be a reliable medical media company. Sperm penetrates egg. As a result, the sperm generates a haploid pronucleus and so does the egg. Each pronucleus appears to be a separate entity--EP and SP, let's call them. They then fuse, forming the diploid cell, Z. If EP and SP are two distinct entities, and they fuse, the logic of identity precludes saying that Z=EP. No, EP and SP go out of existence; Z is a third and new entity.
Here are the crucial frames. There are two separate entities, EP and SP; they are pulled together by "threads" and fuse.
In this clip, the egg is just the site in which EP and SP fuse, forming the new entity Z. Z is inside of the egg, not identical to the egg. We are invited to think Z is the start of a new human being, not the containing egg. In fact, the narrator calls the newly formed single cell a "zygote", instead of using that term to refer to the whole fertilized egg.
Another video tells the same story. Here's the crucial clip of that video with the key frames below. Again, separate pronuclei exist inside the egg and fuse.
Once again, this diagram of fertilization tells a story that suggests two entities fusing to generate a third--
From what I can see, Story (1) is true: EP and SP fuse to become the diploid cell Z, a whole new thing. Z develops inside the egg, using some materials from the egg. If you were once any entity in this complex, you were once Z, not the larger, containing egg.
Can you read things any other way? I guess the eggcentrists see it this way:
Story (2): The egg lives on, after fertilization, just altered profoundly. Both EP and SP go out of existence, after forming Z, but the egg keeps growing. Getting Z as its nucleus does not cause substantial change in the egg, making a new entity come into existence. No, it's the same ol' egg, just doing some amazing new stuff. If you were once any entity in this complex, you were once the egg, with EP, SP, and Z just very important parts of you.
At the very least, I think Story (1) is coherent. Nobody has to read the biological facts as Story (2) has them. I can reasonably think my earliest life was as Z, not as an egg in my mother's ovary.
***
There's another way to block the idea that I was once an egg in my mother's ovary. Marquis actually says it may not be true that I was once a zygote--the entity that exists in the first 14 days after fertilization. He doesn't explain the basis for his doubts, but I would speculate he may be drawing on the very interesting book When Did I Begin? by Norman Ford.
Ford argues that in the first days, a zygote is a collection of separate things, not a unified, single entity. In the first few days, it's so ununified that each cell can develop into a separate entity (making for identical twins, quadruplets, or octuplets).
It's also significant that the early zygote contains the makings of a placenta, umbilical chord, and amniotic fluid. If I was once a 5-day old zygote, then it's also true that my placenta was once a 5-day old zygote. By the logic of identity, it follows I was once a placenta! Not just absurd, but yucky-absurd! Conclusion: I was not once a 5-day old zygote.
Bottom line: I was never an egg. No, condemning the killing of a fetus does not drive us to the absurdity that we mustn't block the fertilization of an egg. You can say a fetus has a FLO but an egg doesn't, because it's not true that we were once eggs. There is no continuous entity that starts off existing before fertilization and continues for the first 14 days and then for the duration of pregnancy, and then through ordinary life, so that it has a FLO. If you want to refute Marquis, you need something else besides the idea that his reasoning turns contraception into murder.
4/18/13
Is it wrong to take the future from a fetus?
Don Marquis's argument against abortion (in "Why Abortion is Immoral") is pleasingly simple. He says the wrongness of killing one of us (folks like you and me who are obvious members of the "moral community") is due to the fact that killing deprives an individual of their entire future, a valuable "Future Like Ours" (FLO) in most cases. But abortion deprives a fetus of a FLO as well. So abortion is presumptively wrong, for the same reason any other killing is presumptively wrong.
What should we say? Since Marquis first made this argument in the 1980s, it's spawned a vast literature. I'm certainly not going to saying anything new and different here. I'm just going to think aloud a bit about how I would respond.
PIFF!
First, a response I would not make. Let's call this "Personal Identity Fancy Footwork" (PIFF!). What you might say is that an entity with my future didn't start to exist when I was conceived, but quite a bit later. Perhaps that entity (J, for short) came into being very late in my mother's pregnancy, or after she had given birth. That, afterall, is when a thing with my conscious mentality came into being. Nothing with my conscious mentality existed at conception, or a month into my gestation, or three months into it. Had my mother contemplated abortion when she was one month pregnant, she would have destroyed F ("my" fetus--so to speak) but not J. J didn't exist yet. F didn't have J's future, if F was not the same entity as J. Abortion certainly would have taken a future from F, but that was a non-conscious future with no special value. F was merely deprived of the next couple of months, months before F gave way to J.
PIFF advocates will have to answer someone who says, understandably enough, "If you take a future from F, then J's future is gone too, right?" The PIFF-er has a coherent response: F exists to be deprived of its future. But once F is gone, because of an abortion, J never comes into existence. So J never exists to be deprived of her future. After an abortion, J will be a merely possible entity. Doing things that eliminate merely possible entities and their futures can't be at all like killing. Otherwise, we're all murderers for not doing our utmost to conceive as many children as we possibly can. If F is non-identical to J, surely that does undermine Marquis's indictment of abortion.
So...PIFF?
I think not. I lean strongly to the view that F is identical to J. So destroying F does take a FLO away from F. Of course it's true that during the course of gestation and growth, F will come to have new properties (like being conscious, feeling pain, having preferences). And I think some of these properties are morally important. But I'm not prepared to say any of these new properties are "existentially" important--that they make for the end of one entity and the beginning of another. The idea that a new entity pops into being once consciousness emerges strikes me as a vestige of dualism. But that's a long story....
Suppose you agree that F is identical to J. You could avail yourself of identity considerations of another kind to construct a reductio ad absurdum of Marquis's argument. You could argue that F is identical to J, but F is also identical to an entity that exists prior to conception. F, you might say, is identical to the egg (E) that's fertilized at conception. If you can make a case for that, then you'll wind up saying that killing F is as bad as killing J; but also having to say (absurdly) that preventing E from being fertilized is as bad as killing F or J. Women who avoid intercourse during ovulation will have to be equated with murderers!
Is that the best available response to Marquis? I think the identity considerations underlying that response are also implausible. No, E is not identical to F. Again, long story.
A TALE OF FOUR BOOKSTORES
The reponse I'm inclined to give to Marquis grants that a new entity comes into existence at conception (or shortly thereafter--there are good reasons to date this just a little later than conception) and continues to exist throughout pregnancy, after birth, and into childhood and adulthood. Abortion therefore does deprive an entity of its whole future--a FLO, if it's going to be a typical future.
What I think we should balk at is the notion that killing is wrong purely because it deprives an entity of its future. No, it's wrong because it deprives an entity of a future to which it is entitled. I don't think you can speak of entitlement in the case of a one-month-old fetus. Just because a fetus is innocent or guiltless, it does not follow that it is entitled to anything.
It's easy to see that it's not always wrong to cause an entity to be deprived of something valuable, but rather wrong only when the entity is entitled to that thing. Take, for example, this tale of four bookstores. Once we had a store called Bookstop in Dallas, but Borders came to town, and people preferred Borders. Bookstop's owners were no doubt deprived of a huge amount of wealth and pleasure. Then Barnes and Noble came to town and all the Borders stores eventually closed. Poor Borders owners! They were also deprived of a huge amount of wealth and pleasure. Now Amazon is making the local Barnes and Noble stores look awfully empty. B&N's owners may be on the verge of being deprived. The winners in these business competitions did nothing wrong. They caused deprivations, but didn't cause weaker businesses to be deprived of anything they were entitled to.
Likewise, if Mary flirts with Margo's boyfriend Mark, and Mark starts to prefer Mary, Margo winds up deprived, but not deprived of anything she was entitled to. If two people are in a race, and the one behind gets in front, the early favorite winds up deprived of winning, but not deprived of anything she was entitled to. And on and on and on. Generally speaking, it's not causing a deprivation that's wrong, but causing someone to be deprived of something they're entitled to.
Is there a difference between what a one month old fetus is entitled to and what folks like us are entitled to? Yes. Why? Because though a fetus is the very same entity as the later infant, child, and adult it will become, it doesn't yet have the morally relevant properties of the later infant, child, or adult. It is not entitled to its future in the way that you or I are entitled to our futures. So abortion is nothing at all like murder. It has some of the elements (the individual killed is deprived) but not all of the elements (the individual killed is not entitled to its future). So Marquis's argument is unsound.
Unsound, but not completely devoid of insight. If a fetus does have a FLO (though one it's not entitled to) that explains why women are not confused at all when they take abortion seriously or have later mixed feelings. That makes very good sense, because abortion does cause a deprivation. It does take the future from an entity, and I think it's not incoherent at all to find that at least somewhat disturbing.
What should we say? Since Marquis first made this argument in the 1980s, it's spawned a vast literature. I'm certainly not going to saying anything new and different here. I'm just going to think aloud a bit about how I would respond.
PIFF!
First, a response I would not make. Let's call this "Personal Identity Fancy Footwork" (PIFF!). What you might say is that an entity with my future didn't start to exist when I was conceived, but quite a bit later. Perhaps that entity (J, for short) came into being very late in my mother's pregnancy, or after she had given birth. That, afterall, is when a thing with my conscious mentality came into being. Nothing with my conscious mentality existed at conception, or a month into my gestation, or three months into it. Had my mother contemplated abortion when she was one month pregnant, she would have destroyed F ("my" fetus--so to speak) but not J. J didn't exist yet. F didn't have J's future, if F was not the same entity as J. Abortion certainly would have taken a future from F, but that was a non-conscious future with no special value. F was merely deprived of the next couple of months, months before F gave way to J.
PIFF advocates will have to answer someone who says, understandably enough, "If you take a future from F, then J's future is gone too, right?" The PIFF-er has a coherent response: F exists to be deprived of its future. But once F is gone, because of an abortion, J never comes into existence. So J never exists to be deprived of her future. After an abortion, J will be a merely possible entity. Doing things that eliminate merely possible entities and their futures can't be at all like killing. Otherwise, we're all murderers for not doing our utmost to conceive as many children as we possibly can. If F is non-identical to J, surely that does undermine Marquis's indictment of abortion.
So...PIFF?
I think not. I lean strongly to the view that F is identical to J. So destroying F does take a FLO away from F. Of course it's true that during the course of gestation and growth, F will come to have new properties (like being conscious, feeling pain, having preferences). And I think some of these properties are morally important. But I'm not prepared to say any of these new properties are "existentially" important--that they make for the end of one entity and the beginning of another. The idea that a new entity pops into being once consciousness emerges strikes me as a vestige of dualism. But that's a long story....
Suppose you agree that F is identical to J. You could avail yourself of identity considerations of another kind to construct a reductio ad absurdum of Marquis's argument. You could argue that F is identical to J, but F is also identical to an entity that exists prior to conception. F, you might say, is identical to the egg (E) that's fertilized at conception. If you can make a case for that, then you'll wind up saying that killing F is as bad as killing J; but also having to say (absurdly) that preventing E from being fertilized is as bad as killing F or J. Women who avoid intercourse during ovulation will have to be equated with murderers!
Is that the best available response to Marquis? I think the identity considerations underlying that response are also implausible. No, E is not identical to F. Again, long story.
A TALE OF FOUR BOOKSTORES
The reponse I'm inclined to give to Marquis grants that a new entity comes into existence at conception (or shortly thereafter--there are good reasons to date this just a little later than conception) and continues to exist throughout pregnancy, after birth, and into childhood and adulthood. Abortion therefore does deprive an entity of its whole future--a FLO, if it's going to be a typical future.
What I think we should balk at is the notion that killing is wrong purely because it deprives an entity of its future. No, it's wrong because it deprives an entity of a future to which it is entitled. I don't think you can speak of entitlement in the case of a one-month-old fetus. Just because a fetus is innocent or guiltless, it does not follow that it is entitled to anything.
It's easy to see that it's not always wrong to cause an entity to be deprived of something valuable, but rather wrong only when the entity is entitled to that thing. Take, for example, this tale of four bookstores. Once we had a store called Bookstop in Dallas, but Borders came to town, and people preferred Borders. Bookstop's owners were no doubt deprived of a huge amount of wealth and pleasure. Then Barnes and Noble came to town and all the Borders stores eventually closed. Poor Borders owners! They were also deprived of a huge amount of wealth and pleasure. Now Amazon is making the local Barnes and Noble stores look awfully empty. B&N's owners may be on the verge of being deprived. The winners in these business competitions did nothing wrong. They caused deprivations, but didn't cause weaker businesses to be deprived of anything they were entitled to.
Likewise, if Mary flirts with Margo's boyfriend Mark, and Mark starts to prefer Mary, Margo winds up deprived, but not deprived of anything she was entitled to. If two people are in a race, and the one behind gets in front, the early favorite winds up deprived of winning, but not deprived of anything she was entitled to. And on and on and on. Generally speaking, it's not causing a deprivation that's wrong, but causing someone to be deprived of something they're entitled to.
Is there a difference between what a one month old fetus is entitled to and what folks like us are entitled to? Yes. Why? Because though a fetus is the very same entity as the later infant, child, and adult it will become, it doesn't yet have the morally relevant properties of the later infant, child, or adult. It is not entitled to its future in the way that you or I are entitled to our futures. So abortion is nothing at all like murder. It has some of the elements (the individual killed is deprived) but not all of the elements (the individual killed is not entitled to its future). So Marquis's argument is unsound.
Unsound, but not completely devoid of insight. If a fetus does have a FLO (though one it's not entitled to) that explains why women are not confused at all when they take abortion seriously or have later mixed feelings. That makes very good sense, because abortion does cause a deprivation. It does take the future from an entity, and I think it's not incoherent at all to find that at least somewhat disturbing.
4/6/13
How to argue against gay marriage (part III)
And now for the rebuttal. In the last post I said that if I had to make an argument against gay marriage--in a debate club setting, or some such--then perhaps I'd say this:
Even if a sizable and certain risk could be established, we'd have to explain why procreative dangers ought to stop us from letting same sex couples marry, while we allow very old men to marry young women (danger: offspring who quickly lose their fathers); and we allow "little people" to marry (danger: high risk of progeny with dwarfism), etc. etc. We grant everyone the legal right to marry who they wish, and normally take it as a private moral question who should procreate, and how.
Well, it was the best I could do. In the comments to the last two posts people suggested some other bad arguments against gay marriage--bad arguments better than some of the usual fare. At least none of our suggestions involve the idea that once you allow gay marriage, you've got to let people marry their cats. The opponents of gay marriage typically seem not to be satisfied with making bad arguments; they like to go for completely atrocious.
- There's a great deal of value in knowing both of your biological parents and being raised by them (other things being equal--of course there are exceptions).
- The normal way of procreating for same sex couples involves a gamete donor, so that the child knows and is raised by at most one biological parent.
- If same sex couples are permitted to marry, their normal way of procreating will be elevated to parity with the heterosexual way of procreating.
- Because of that elevation to parity, we will all gradually lose sight of the value of knowing both of your biological parents and being raised by them.
- Losing sight of a kind of value tends to cause that sort of value to be less pursued and less protected. Possible sequelae: couples (straight or gay) buying gametes to have the type of child they prefer (an intellectual, an athlete, or whatever); rights of biological parents being less protected.
- There isn't the same problem with infertile heterosexual couples being able to marry, since using a gamete donor is not their normal way of procreating, but usually a last resort chosen after years of medical intervention. THEREFORE,
- Same sex marriage should be prohibited (but marriage of heterosexuals who may turn out to be infertile should be allowed).
It is not good enough just to say "gay marriage might be bad for someone else, therefore all these gay people don't have it." In fact, every life is important, and those gay lives must be weighed in the balance.There's no quick step from procreative risks to denial of marriage rights. The risks, even if they were considerable, would have to be weighed against the rights and legitimate preferences of gay people themselves.
Even if a sizable and certain risk could be established, we'd have to explain why procreative dangers ought to stop us from letting same sex couples marry, while we allow very old men to marry young women (danger: offspring who quickly lose their fathers); and we allow "little people" to marry (danger: high risk of progeny with dwarfism), etc. etc. We grant everyone the legal right to marry who they wish, and normally take it as a private moral question who should procreate, and how.
Well, it was the best I could do. In the comments to the last two posts people suggested some other bad arguments against gay marriage--bad arguments better than some of the usual fare. At least none of our suggestions involve the idea that once you allow gay marriage, you've got to let people marry their cats. The opponents of gay marriage typically seem not to be satisfied with making bad arguments; they like to go for completely atrocious.
4/4/13
How to argue against gay marriage (part II)
This is certainly a diabolical exercise. I am for marriage equality, and I think most reasonable people are for marriage equality. But what if a college debate society were staging a debate, and you got assigned the "against" side? What could you say? Most of the stuff normally said on that side is extremely silly. Is there anything even half-way reasonable to say against gay marriage? In yesterday's post, I gave it my best shot. Let's see if I can spell out that argument more precisely.
- There's a great deal of value in knowing both of your biological parents and being raised by them (other things being equal--of course there are exceptions).
- The normal way of procreating for same sex couples involves a gamete donor, so that the child knows and is raised by at most one biological parent.
- If same sex couples are permitted to marry, their normal way of procreating will be elevated to parity with the heterosexual way of procreating.
- Because of that elevation to parity, we will all gradually lose sight of the value of knowing both of your biological parents and being raised by them.
- Losing sight of a kind of value tends to cause that sort of value to be less pursued and less protected. Possible sequelae: couples (straight or gay) buying gametes to have the type of child they prefer (an intellectual, an athlete, or whatever); rights of biological parents being less protected.
- There isn't the same problem with infertile heterosexual couples being able to marry, since using a gamete donor is not their normal way of procreating, but usually a last resort chosen after years of medical intervention. THEREFORE,
- Same sex marriage should be prohibited (but marriage of heterosexuals who may turn out to be infertile should be allowed).
4/3/13
How to argue against same sex marriage (part I)
In my contemporary moral problems class this semester we've been discussing same sex marriage. We paid close attention to the Supreme Court oral arguments on Prop. 8 and DOMA last week. We've been reading articles "pro" and "con"...and, honestly, it seems to me that all the best arguments are "pro". I'm definitely in favor of legalizing gay marriage. That said, lately I keep wondering: what if I were in a debate club, and I were assigned the "con" side? What would I say? What's the best argument you could construct for marriage inequality? Perhaps it's mischievous of me (since I do support same sex marriage), but I find this an interesting question. So, here goes: the best I can do on the "con" side.
The best case I think you could make against gay marriage has to do with procreative issues. The problem, in a nutshell, is that same sex marriage normalizes donor-assisted reproduction. Marriage goes hand in hand with creating a family, and same sex couples can't procreate without a sperm donor or egg donor. Now, dependence on gamete donors doesn't make same sex couples unique. In some situations, infertile heterosexual couples use donor-assisted reproduction too. But there's a difference: when heterosexual couples resort to gamete donation, they almost always regard their situation as abnormal--like having a broken leg. Infertile heterosexual couples will typically spend years pursuing medical remedies, so they can avoided donor gametes. When they do go the donor route, it's fair to say they see that as second best, not at all as normal. By contrast, for a same sex couple it's completely normal to need donor gametes. It's in the nature of a gay or lesbian relationship--the only route same sex couples have to making a baby with a biological connection to either partner. If gay marriage puts same sex couples on an equal footing with opposite sex couples, donor-assisted reproduction is also going to wind up on an equal footing with ordinary reproduction.
Now, you may ask, would that be bad? Is there anything really wrong with donor-assisted reproduction? Where's the problem? I think we can point to a problem, so long as we don't think of "problem" in some medical sense. Problems don't have to involve a patient--someone in need of pain relief, medical care, psychiatric treatment, or what not. Donor assisted reproduction doesn't yield people who are badly off in the "now we have a patient" sense. It just creates children who don't have the usual connection to both parents. Donor-origin children have to live with the thought that the parent they came from, in the biological sense, was a mere egg or sperm donor. That gives the child an existential problem, not a medical problem. It's not the biggest problem in the world, but we wouldn't want to head toward a future in which lots and lots of children have that problem. And, the argument goes, creating a class of married couples who by nature must reproduce that way will lead us in that direction. This is not just because of their donor-origin children existing, but because of the message that same sex marrying sends: "this way of coupling and creating a family is perfectly normal and no worse than the heterosexual way."
Now, is the procreative message really inevitable? Could the message be, more simply, "this way of coupling is perfectly normal and no worse than the heterosexual way?" (That's surely a perfectly good message.) Could gay marriage normalize the coupling, but leave it open whether donor-assisted reproduction is just fine, or not just fine? Easier said than done. Once you normalize the coupling, it's hard to hang onto the idea that there's something not entirely good about the procreating that often results from that sort of coupling. It's hard to say that the marriages of same-sex couples are fine, but their only means of biological procreation is at all problematic. Again, this is not so when it comes to heterosexual infertile couples. They know that donor-assisted reproduction is problematic. They don't want it, as evidenced by the vast amount of money and time they typically put into avoiding it. So you can't "reductio" the present argument by saying it leads to a prohibition on the marriage of infertile couples: it doesn't.
Bottom line: we're heading for a revolution in our thinking about reproduction when donor-assisted reproduction is the norm in an identifiable group of married couples. Solution: don't let them be married couples. Keep their coupling second class, precisely to avoid normalizing their approach to procreation.
There you go. That's the best I can do. Since I'm for marriage equality, I can't possibly accept all of this. I find it interesting to ponder the argument, though, to the extent that I also don't reject all of it. I think there's some truth in the argument. There are true premises and there are also false premises. All to be teased out in part II of this post...coming soon.
The best case I think you could make against gay marriage has to do with procreative issues. The problem, in a nutshell, is that same sex marriage normalizes donor-assisted reproduction. Marriage goes hand in hand with creating a family, and same sex couples can't procreate without a sperm donor or egg donor. Now, dependence on gamete donors doesn't make same sex couples unique. In some situations, infertile heterosexual couples use donor-assisted reproduction too. But there's a difference: when heterosexual couples resort to gamete donation, they almost always regard their situation as abnormal--like having a broken leg. Infertile heterosexual couples will typically spend years pursuing medical remedies, so they can avoided donor gametes. When they do go the donor route, it's fair to say they see that as second best, not at all as normal. By contrast, for a same sex couple it's completely normal to need donor gametes. It's in the nature of a gay or lesbian relationship--the only route same sex couples have to making a baby with a biological connection to either partner. If gay marriage puts same sex couples on an equal footing with opposite sex couples, donor-assisted reproduction is also going to wind up on an equal footing with ordinary reproduction.
Now, you may ask, would that be bad? Is there anything really wrong with donor-assisted reproduction? Where's the problem? I think we can point to a problem, so long as we don't think of "problem" in some medical sense. Problems don't have to involve a patient--someone in need of pain relief, medical care, psychiatric treatment, or what not. Donor assisted reproduction doesn't yield people who are badly off in the "now we have a patient" sense. It just creates children who don't have the usual connection to both parents. Donor-origin children have to live with the thought that the parent they came from, in the biological sense, was a mere egg or sperm donor. That gives the child an existential problem, not a medical problem. It's not the biggest problem in the world, but we wouldn't want to head toward a future in which lots and lots of children have that problem. And, the argument goes, creating a class of married couples who by nature must reproduce that way will lead us in that direction. This is not just because of their donor-origin children existing, but because of the message that same sex marrying sends: "this way of coupling and creating a family is perfectly normal and no worse than the heterosexual way."
Now, is the procreative message really inevitable? Could the message be, more simply, "this way of coupling is perfectly normal and no worse than the heterosexual way?" (That's surely a perfectly good message.) Could gay marriage normalize the coupling, but leave it open whether donor-assisted reproduction is just fine, or not just fine? Easier said than done. Once you normalize the coupling, it's hard to hang onto the idea that there's something not entirely good about the procreating that often results from that sort of coupling. It's hard to say that the marriages of same-sex couples are fine, but their only means of biological procreation is at all problematic. Again, this is not so when it comes to heterosexual infertile couples. They know that donor-assisted reproduction is problematic. They don't want it, as evidenced by the vast amount of money and time they typically put into avoiding it. So you can't "reductio" the present argument by saying it leads to a prohibition on the marriage of infertile couples: it doesn't.
Bottom line: we're heading for a revolution in our thinking about reproduction when donor-assisted reproduction is the norm in an identifiable group of married couples. Solution: don't let them be married couples. Keep their coupling second class, precisely to avoid normalizing their approach to procreation.
There you go. That's the best I can do. Since I'm for marriage equality, I can't possibly accept all of this. I find it interesting to ponder the argument, though, to the extent that I also don't reject all of it. I think there's some truth in the argument. There are true premises and there are also false premises. All to be teased out in part II of this post...coming soon.